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Abstract
In their seminal work on the Stable Marriage Problem, Gale and Shapley [4] de-
scribe an algorithm which finds a stable matching in O(n2) communication rounds.
Their algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm where each
player is represented by a single processor. In this distributed model, Flore´en, Kaski,
Polishchuk, and Suomela [3] recently showed that for bounded preference lists, ter-
minating the Gale-Shapley algorithm after a constant number of rounds results in an
almost stable matching. In this paper, we describe a new deterministic distributed
algorithm which finds an almost stable matching in O(log5 n) communication rounds
for arbitrary preferences. We also present a faster randomized variant which requires
O(log2 n) rounds. This run-time can be improved to O(1) rounds for “almost regu-
lar” (and in particular complete) preferences. To our knowledge, these are the first
sub-polynomial round distributed algorithms for any variant of the stable marriage
problem with unbounded preferences.
1 Introduction
1.1 Historical Background
In their seminal work, Gale and Shapley [4] consider the following problem. Members of disjoint
sets of n men and n women each rank all members of the opposite sex. The men and women
(which we collectively call players) wish to form a matching—a one-to-one correspondence
between the men and women—which is stable in the sense that it contains no blocking pairs:
pairs of players who mutually prefer each other to their assigned partners in the matching.
Gale and Shapley showed that a stable matching always exists by giving an explicit algorithm
for finding one. The centralized Gale-Shapley algorithm runs in time O˜(n2), and this run-time
is asymptotically optimal for centralized algorithms [5]. The Gale-Shapley algorithm easily
generalizes to the case of incomplete preferences where each player ranks only a subset of
the members of the opposite sex [5].
The Gale-Shapley algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm, where
each player is represented by a separate processor which privately holds that player’s preferences.
The communication links between players are formed by pairs of players who appear on each
other’s preference lists. This model is natural in, for example, social networks where players
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may be constrained to be matched with acquaintances and do not communicate with strangers.
In this model, the input to each processor has size O˜(n), yet there is still no known distributed
algorithm which improves upon the Gale-Shapley algorithm’s O˜(n2) run-time for arbitrary
preferences.1
Recently, there has been interest in approximate versions of the stable marriage problem
[1, 2, 3, 7, 9], where the goal is to find a matching which is “almost stable.” There is no
consensus in the literature on precisely how to measure almost stability, but typically almost
stability requires that a matching induces relatively few blocking pairs. Eriksson and Ha¨ggstro¨m
[2] argue that, “the proportion of blocking pairs among all possible pairs is usually the best
measure of instability.” Using a finer notion of almost stability, Flore´en, Kaski, Polishchuk, and
Suomela show [3] that for bounded preference lists, truncating the Gale-Shapley algorithm after
boundedly many communication rounds yields a matching that induces at most ε |M | blocking
pairs. Here |M | is the size of the matching produced. More recently, Hassidim, Mansour and
Vardi [7] show a similar result in a more restrictive “local” computational model, so long as the
men’s preferences are chosen uniformly at random.
Kipnis and Patt-Shamir [9] give an algorithm which finds an almost stable matching using
O(n) communication rounds in the worst case, using a finer notion of approximate stability
than we consider. Specifically, in their notion of almost-stability, a matching is almost stable if
no pair of players can both improve their match by more than an ε-fraction of their preference
list by deviating from their assigned partners. They also prove an Ω(
√
n/ log n) communication
round lower bound for finding an approximate stable matching for this notion of approximation.
1.2 Overview of Results
We consider an approximate version of the stable marriage problem where an almost stable
matching is allowed to have ε |E| blocking pairs. Here E is the set of pairs of men and women
who rank one another (that is, the set of edges in the communication graph). Our notion of
approximation, which generalizes almost stability as described in [2], is strictly coarser than
those used in [3] and [9]. However, for bounded preference (the context of [3]), our notion of
instability agrees with that of [3] up to a constant factor.
Using the notion of almost stability given above, we describe a deterministic distributed
algorithm, ASM, which produces an almost stable matching inO(log5(n)) rounds. We note that
in order to obtain this sub-polynomial run-time, we cannot use a finer notion of approximation
than [9], who prove an Ω(
√
n/ log n) round lower bound for their model. We remark that
the after removing an arbitrarily small fraction of “bad” players, the output of ASM is almost
stable in the sense of [9] as well. We further describe a faster randomized variant of ASM which
runs in O(log2(n)) rounds. For preferences which are “almost regular,” (and in particular for
complete preferences) this run-time can be improved to O(1).
Theorem 1.1. There exists a deterministic distributed algorithm ASM which produces a
(1 − ε)-stable matching in O(log5(n)) communication rounds. A randomized variant of the
algorithm, RandASM runs in O(log2(n)) rounds for general preferences, and can be improved
to O(1) rounds for almost regular (and in particular complete) preferences.
ASM can be viewed as a generalization of the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm [4] which
allows for multiple simultaneous proposals by the men and acceptances by the women. In
ASM, the players quantize their preferences into O(ε−1) quantiles of equal size. In each step
of the algorithm, the men propose to all women in their best nonempty quantile. Each woman
accepts proposals only from her best quantile receiving proposals. A maximal matching is then
1In the distributed computational model with complete preferences, each player can broadcast their preferences
to all other players in O(n) rounds, after which each player runs a centralized version of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm. While this process requires only O(n) communication rounds, the synchronous distributed run-time
is still Θ˜(n2) in the worst case.
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found among the accepted proposals, and matched women reject men they do not prefer to
their matches. This procedure is iterated until a large fraction of men are either matched or
have been rejected by all women.
The analysis of our algorithm follows in two steps. We first show that by quantizing pref-
erences, the matching found by ASM cannot contain a large fraction of blocking pairs among
the matched (or rejected) players. We bound the number of blocking pairs from the remain-
ing “bad” players by showing there are few such players, and that only a small fraction can
participate in many blocking pairs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formalize our notion
almost stable matchings and our computational model. We also overview methods of computing
maximal matchings which our algorithm will require as subroutines. Section 3 describes ASM
and its subroutines in detail and states basic guarantees for the subroutines. Section 4 proves
the performance guarantees for ASM. Finally, in Section 5 we describe the randomized variants
of ASM.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Stable and almost stable matchings
We consider the stable marriage problem as originally described by Gale and Shapley [4] with
incomplete preferences or, equivalently, unacceptable partners (cf. [5, 10]). Let X and Y be
sets of women and men, respectively. For simplicity, we assume |X| = |Y | = n. Each player
v ∈ X ∪ Y holds a preference list or ranking P v—a linear order on a subset of the members
of the opposite sex. We denote the set of all player’s preferences by P = {P v|v ∈ X ∪ Y }. We
refer to the players u that appear on v’s preference list P v as v’s acceptable partners. We
call P complete if each player ranks all players of the opposite sex. If a man m precedes m′
on woman w’s preference list, we write m ≻w m′, and we say that w prefers m to m′. For
simplicity, we assume that preferences are symmetric in the sense that if m appears in Pw, then
w appears in Pm. Given players v and u of opposite genders, we let P v(u) denote v’s rank of
u. For example, P v(u) = 1 means that u is v’s most favored partner, et cetera.
We define the communication graph G = (V,E) for a set of preferences P to be
V = Y ×X, E = {(m,w)|m ∈ Pw, w ∈ Pm} .
For a communication graph G = (V,E), we denote the degree of v ∈ V by deg v, which is the
number of players that appear on v’s preference list.
A matching M ⊆ E is a set of edges in E such that no two edges share a vertex. Given a
matching M and (m,w) ∈ M , we call m and w partners and write p(w) = m and p(m) = w.
Given preferences and a matching M , we say that an edge (m,w) ∈ E is a blocking pair if
(m,w) /∈M , but m and w mutually prefer each other to their partners in M ; that is,
m ≻w p(w) and w ≻m p(m).
By convention, we assume each unmatched player (p(v) = ∅) prefers all acceptable partners to
being without a partner. A stable matching is a matching which contains no blocking pairs.
We are primarily concerned with finding matchings which are “almost stable” in the sense
that they induce relatively few blocking pairs. We use a definition of almost stability given by
Eriksson and Ha¨ggstro¨m [2], modified to allow for incomplete preference lists.
Definition 2.1. Given ε ≥ 0 and preferences P, we say that a matching M is (1 − ε)-stable
with respect to P if M induces at most ε |E| blocking pairs with respect to P.
We refer to the problem of finding a matching which is (1− ε)-stable for fixed ε > 0 as the
almost stable matching problem . Note that a 1-stable matching corresponds precisely to
the classical stable matching definition.
3
Remark 2.2. Again, we reiterate that there is no consensus in the literature on the precise
definition of almost stability. For example, the authors of [3] compare the number of blocking
pairs to |M |, the size of the matching rather than |E|, as we do. Since in [3], they only consider
bounded preference lists, their notion of almost stability agrees with Definition 2.1 up to a
constant factor.
Definition 2.3 (Kipnis and Patt-Shamir [9]). Given ε ≥ 0, preferences P, and a matching M
we call an edge (m,w) ∈ E ε-blocking if m and w appear an ε-fraction higher on each other’s
preferences than their assigned partners. Specifically, (m,w) is ε-blocking if
Pm(p(m)) − Pm(w) ≥ εdegm and Pw(p(w))− Pw(m) ≥ εdegw.
We say that M is ε-blocking-stable if it contains no ε-blocking pairs.
Remark 2.4. Kipnis and Patt-Shamir [9] prove an Ω(
√
n/ log n) round lower bound for finding
an ε-blocking-stable matching. That we are able to achieve a polylogarithmic round algorithm
for the almost stable matching problem using Definition 2.1 bolsters the use of Definition 2.1 for
almost stability, at least for practical applications. Further, ASM produces a matching which
is nearly ε-blocking-stable in the sense that after the removal of an arbitrarily small fraction of
“bad” men, the resulting matching is ε-blocking stable with respect to the remaining players.
2.2 Computational model
We describeASM in terms of the CONGESTmodel formalized by Peleg [11]. In this distributed
computational model, each player v ∈ X ∪ Y represents a processor. Given preferences P, the
communication links between the players are given by the set of edges E in the communication
graph G. Communication is performed in synchronous rounds. Each communication round
occurs in three stages: first, each processor receives messages (if any) sent from its neighbors
in G during the previous round. Next, each processor performs local calculations based on its
internal state and any received messages. We make no restrictions on the complexity of local
computations. Finally, each processor sends short (O(log n) bit) messages to its neighbors in
G—the processor may send distinct messages to distinct neighbors. In the CONGEST model,
complexity is measured by the number of communication rounds needed to solve a problem.
Remark 2.5. Although the CONGEST model allows for unbounded local computation during
each round, the computations required by ASM can be implemented in linear or near-linear
time in each processor’s input.
2.3 Maximal matchings
As a subroutine, ASM requires a method for computing maximal matchings in a graph.
Definition 2.6. A matching M is a maximal matching if it is not properly contained in any
larger matching. Equivalently, M is maximal if and only if every v ∈ V satisfies precisely one
of the following conditions:
1. there exists a unique u ∈ V with (v, u) ∈M ;
2. for all u ∈ N(v) there exists v′ ∈ V with v′ 6= v such that (v′, u) ∈M .
For the deterministic version of our algorithm, we invoke the work of Hann´c´kowiak, Karon´ski,
and Panconesi [6] who give a deterministic distributed algorithm which finds a maximal match-
ing in a polylogarithmic number of rounds.
Theorem 2.7 (Hann´c´kowiak, Karon´ski, and Panconesi [6]). There exists a deterministic dis-
tributed algorithm, MaximalMatching, which finds a maximal matching in a communication
graph G = (V,E) in log4(n) rounds, where n = |V |.
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We remark that while the authors of [6] do not explicitly use the CONGEST model for
computation, their algorithm can easily be implemented in this model.
The randomized variants of ASM require faster (randomized) subroutines for computing
maximal and “almost maximal” matchings in a communication graph. In Appendix A, we
describe how to modify an algorithm of Israeli and Itai [8] to give the necessary results.
3 Deterministic algorithm description
In this section, we describe in detail the almost stable matching algorithm, ASM. The main
algorithm invokes the subroutine QuantileMatch which in turn calls ProposalRound. In
Section 3.1 we introduce notation, and describe the internal state of each processor during the
execution ofASM. Section 3.2 contains a description of the ProposalRound subroutine, while
Section 3.3 describes the QuantileMatch subroutine. Finally, Section 3.4 describes ASM.
3.1 The state of a processor
In our algorithm, we assume that each player is represented by an independent processor. Each
processor has a unique id and a gender (male or female) both of which are known to that
processor. The only global information known to each processor is (an upper bound on) n, the
total number of processors. At each step of the algorithm, we specify the state of each processor
as well as any messages the processor might send or receive. The state of a player v consists of:
• Quantized preferences Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk where we denote Q =
⋃
Qi. Initially Q1 is the set
of v’s deg v/k favorite men, Q2 is her next favorite deg(v)/k, and so on. We call Qi w’s
ith quantile . For m ∈ Qi, we write q(m) = i. If we wish to make explicit the player
to whom the preferences belong, we may adorn these symbols with a superscript. For
example, Qv
i
is v’s ith quantile. Throughout the execution of the algorithm, elements may
be removed from Q and the Qis, but elements will never be added to any of these sets.
We will always use k to denote the number of quantiles for the players’ preferences.
• A partner p (possibly empty). The partner p is v’s current partner in the matching
M our algorithm constructs. To emphasize that p is player v’s partner, we will write
p(v). The (partial) matching M produced by the algorithm at any step is given by
M = {(p(w), w)|w ∈ X, p(w) 6= ∅}.
Additionally, subroutines of our algorithm will require each processor to store the following
variables:
• A set G0 of “neighbors” of the opposite sex which correspond to accepted proposals.
• A partner p0 in a matching found in the graph determined by G0.
Thus each player knows their preferences, partners (if any) as well as any of their accepted
proposals from the current round (stored in G0). The men m ∈ Y hold the following additional
information:
• A set A of “active” potential mates, initially set to Q1.
3.2 The ProposalRound subroutine
At the heart of our algorithm is the ProposalRound subroutine (Algorithm 1). Proposal-
Round works in 5 steps which are described in Algorithm 1.
We observe that if each player v takes k = deg v, then ProposalRound mimics the classical
(extended) Gale-Shapley algorithm [4, 5]. In this case, each man proposes to his most favored
woman that has not yet rejected him, and each woman rejects all but her most favored suitor.
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Algorithm 1 ProposalRound(Q, k,A)
Step 1: Each man m proposes to all women in Am by sending each w ∈ A the message
PROPOSE.
Step 2: Each women w receiving proposals responds with the message ACCEPT to all pro-
posals from her most preferred quantile Qw
i
from which at least one man proposed in Step
1.
Step 3: Let G0 denote the bipartite graph G0 of accepted proposals from Step 2. The players
compute a maximal matching M0 in G0, using MaximalMatching(G0), storing their
match in G0 as p0.
Step 4: Each woman w matched in M0 sends REJECT to all men m ∈ Qw in a lesser or equal
quantile to her partner p0(w) in M0 other than p0(w). She then removes all of these men
from Qw and the corresponding Qw
i
. The matched women then set p← p0, so the partial
matching M now contains the edge (p0(w), w). Any man m matched in M0 sets p ← p0
and sets A← ∅.
Step 5: The men remove all w from whom they received the message REJECT from their
preferences Q, the various Qi and A. If a man m receives a rejection from his match p(m)
from a previous round, he sets p← ∅.
Computing a maximal matching is trivial, as the accepted proposals already form a matching.
The general case has one crucial feature in common with the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which
follows immediately from the description of ProposalRound.
Lemma 3.1 (Monotonicity). Once a woman w has p(w) 6= ∅ in some execution of Propos-
alRound, she is guaranteed to always have p(w) 6= ∅ after each subsequent execution of
ProposalRound. Further, once matched, she will only accept proposals from men in a strictly
higher quantile than her current match, p(w).
3.3 The QuantileMatch subroutine
Here we describe the QuantileMatch subroutine (Algorithm 2), which simply iterates Pro-
posalRound until each man m has either been rejected by all women in Am or is matched
with some woman in Am. In either case, Am = ∅ when QuantileMatch terminates. We will
argue that k (the number of quantiles) iterations suffice.
Algorithm 2 QuantileMatch(Q, k)
i← min {i|Qi 6= ∅} ∪ {k} (male only)
if p = ∅ then
A← Qi (male only)
end if
for i← 1 to k do
ProposalRound(Q, k,A)
end for
Lemma 3.2 (QuantileMatch guarantee). At the termination of QuantileMatch(Q, k) every
man m satisfies Am = ∅. In particular, each man who had Am 6= ∅ before the first iteration of
the loop in QuantileMatch has either been rejected by all women in Am or is matched with
some woman in Am.
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Proof. Suppose a woman w receives proposals in the first iteration of the loop in Quan-
tileMatch. If she is matched with one of these suitors when ProposalRound terminates,
she rejects all other men and receives no further proposals during the current QuantileMatch.
On the other hand, if she is not matched with one of these suitors after the first round, then
by the maximality of the matching found in Step 3 of ProposalRound, all of the suitors in
her best quantile receiving proposals are matched with other women. Thus, in the next itera-
tion, she only receives proposals from men in strictly worse quantiles than she accepted in the
first. Similarly, in each iteration of the loop, her best quantile receiving proposals (if any) is
strictly worse than the previous iteration. Therefore, after k iterations, no woman will receive
proposals, hence each man m must have Am = ∅.
3.4 The ASM algorithm
In this section, we describe the main algorithm ASM (Algorithm 3). The idea of ASM is to
iterate QuantileMatch until a large fraction men with high degree are either matched or have
been rejected by all acceptable partners. We call such men good . By iterating QuantileMatch
a constant number of times, we can ensure that the fraction of good men is close to 1. In order
to bound the number of blocking pairs from men which are bad (not good), we must ensure
that bad men comprise only a small fraction of players with relatively high degree. To this
end, we only allow men who are potentially involved in many blocking pairs (that is, with |Q|
relatively large) to participate in later calls to QuantileMatch.
Algorithm 3 ASM(P, ε, n)
k ← ⌈8ε−1⌉ , δ ← ε/8
for all i ≤ k do
Qi ← {v|q(v) = i}
end for
Q← ⋃
i
Qi, p← ∅
for i← 0 to log n do
if |Q| ≥ 2i then
for j ← 1 to 2δ−1k do
QuantileMatch(Q, k)
end for
end if
end for
4 Performance guarantees
Here we analyze the performance of ASM and its subroutines. The run-time guarantee (The-
orem 4.7) is a simple consequence of the description of ASM and its subroutines. To prove
the approximation guarantee (Theorem 4.1), we consider blocking edges from two sets of men
separately. We call a man m good if when ASM terminates, he is either matched or has been
rejected by all of his acceptable partners. A man who is not good is bad . We denote the sets
of good and bad men by G and B, respectively.
Theorem 4.1 (Approximation guarantee). The matching M output by ASM induces at most
ε |E| blocking pairs with respect to P. Thus M is (1− ε)-stable.
4.1 Bounding blocking pairs from good players
We bound the number of blocking pairs from good men in two steps. First we show that the
good men are not involved in any (2/k)-blocking pairs (see Definition 2.3). Next, we show that
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as a result, the good men can only be incident with a small fraction of blocking pairs.
Lemma 4.2 ((2/k)-blocking-stability of good men). Letm ∈ G be good. Thenm is not incident
with any (2/k)-blocking pairs.
Proof. Suppose m ∈ G and that (m,w) is (2/k)-blocking. First consider the case where m
is matched, p(m) 6= ∅. Since m’s preferences are divided into k quantiles, w must be in a
strictly better quantile than p(m). Thus, m must have proposed to w in a strictly earlier call
to QuantileMatch than the call in which he was matched with p(m). Thus, by Lemma 3.2,
m must have been rejected by w, implying that w was matched with a man m′ in the same or
better quantile than m in this round. By Lemma 3.1, w’s partner when ASM terminates is at
least as desirable as m′. This contradicts that (m,w) is ε-blocking.
On the other hand, if p(m) = ∅, then since m is good, he must have been rejected by all of
his acceptable partners, and in particular, by w. Thus, as in the previous paragraph, w must
be matched with a man in the same or better quantile than m.
Lemma 4.3 (Few non-(2/k)-blocking pairs). There are at most 4 |E| /k blocking pairs which
are not (2/k)-blocking.
Proof. Suppose (m,w) is a blocking pair which is not (2/k)-blocking. Thus, we have
Pm(w)− Pm(p(m)) ≤ 2 deg(m)/k or Pw(m)− Pw(p(w)) ≤ 2 deg(w)/k, (1)
where by convention we take Pm(∅) = deg(m) + 1. Let EN denote the set of blocking pairs
which are not (2/k)-blocking. For each m, the number of edges satisfying the first inequality in
(1) is at most 2 deg(m)/k, and similarly for the women. Thus
|EN | ≤
∑
m∈Y
2 deg(m)/k +
∑
w∈X
2 deg(w)/k = 4 |E| /k,
as desired.
Lemma 4.3 shows that no good player is involved in any (2/k)-blocking pairs. Combining
Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3, we can bound the number of blocking pairs incident with good men. All
that remains is to bound the number of (2/k)-blocking pairs incident with bad men. In the next
section, we show that the proportion of bad men is small (at most δn), and bound the number
of (2/k)-blocking pairs they contribute. We remark that by Lemma 4.3 and the lower bound of
Kipnis and Patt-Shamir [9], we cannot hope to have all men be good in o(
√
n/ log n) rounds.
4.2 Bounding blocking pairs from bad players
In this section, we prove the following bound on the number of blocking pairs contributed by
the bad men at the termination of ASM. Throughout the section, for simplicity of notation,
we assume that log n is an integer.
Lemma 4.4 (Bad men guarantee). At the termination of ASM, for any δ ≤ 1
2
the bad men
contribute at most 4δ |E| (2/k)-blocking pairs.
The proof of Lemma 4.4 is in two parts corresponding to guarantees for each of the two
nested loops in ASM. We refer to men m with |Qm| ≥ 2i as active in the ith iteration of
the outer loop; the remaining men are inactive in the ith iteration.
Lemma 4.5 (Few bad men). When the inner loop in ASM terminates, at most a δ-fraction of
active men are bad.
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Proof. Let A denote the set of active men before executing the inner loop in ASM. Suppose
that after ℓ iterations of the inner loop, there are b bad men in A. We claim that there must
have been at least b bad players in every iteration of the inner loop. To see this, first note that
by Lemma 3.1, the number of matched players (and hence matched men) can only increase with
each call to ProposalRound. Second, if a man is rejected by all women on his preference list,
he will never become bad. Therefore, the number of good players can only increase with each
iteration of the inner loop. Thus there must have been at least b bad men after each of the ℓ
iterations of the inner loop.
Suppose m was bad before some call to QuantileMatch, so that Am 6= ∅. By Lemma 3.2,
after QuantileMatch m is either matched, or has been rejected by all women w ∈ Am. In the
former case, p(m) rejected all men in her quantile containing m. In either case, m witnessed the
rejection of a quantile of men—either by precipitating the rejection of p(m)’s quantile, or by
being rejected by all women in A. Notice that the number of women who are matched with new
partners during an iteration of the outer loop cannot exceed |A|, as if |A| women did receive
new partners, all active men would be matched. Therefore, the women can send at most k |A|
quantile rejections (after which all active men will be rejected by all women). Similarly, the men
can receive at most k |A| quantile rejections. Thus, in total the active men can witness at most
2k |A| quantile rejections. Therefore, if there are b bad men after ℓ calls to QuantileMatch,
we must have bℓ ≤ 2k |A|. Choosing ℓ = 2δ−1k gives the desired result.
We say that a man m is bad in the ith iteration of the outer loop in ASM if m became
bad during the ith iteration and |Qm| < 2i. Thus, m ∈ Bi is bad and will not participate in
any further calls to QuantileMatch, so he will be bad when ASM terminates. We denote the
set bad men in the i iteration by Bi, so that B = B1 ∪B2 ∪ · · · ∪Blogn.
Lemma 4.6 (Few (2/k)-blocking pairs). Each m ∈ Bi participates in fewer than 2i (2/k)-
blocking pairs at the termination of ASM.
Proof. We will show that each bad m ∈ B participates in at most |Qm| (2/k)-blocking pairs,
whence the lemma follows. To this end, notice that if w /∈ Qm, then w must have rejected m in
some call to QuantileMatch. Therefore, w must have been matched with some m′ that is in
the same or better quantile as m. By Lemma 3.1, when ASM terminates, w is still matched
with someone in at least as desirable quantile as m, implying that (m,w) is not (2/k)-blocking.
Thus, every (2/k)-blocking pair (m,w) must have w ∈ Qm.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Let Gi ⊆ G be the set of men which are good at the termination of ASM
and active after the ith iteration of the outer loop in ASM. Then we have G = G1 ∪ G2 ∪
· · · ∪Glogn. Since the number of bad men cannot increase after a call to QuantileMatch. By
Lemma 4.5, if there were b men which became bad in some iteration of the outer loop of ASM,
there were 1−δ
δ
b good men still active during the ith iteration. Since the number of good men
can only increase in subsequent iterations, we have
|Bi ∪Bi+1 ∪ · · · ∪Blogn| ≤ b ≤ δ
1− δ |Gi ∪Gi+1 ∪ · · · ∪Glog n| . (2)
Applying (2), we can greedily form disjoint sets
Hlogn ⊆ Glogn, Hlogn−1 ⊆ Glog
n
−1 ∪Glogn, . . . ,H1 ⊆ G
such that for all i, Hi is active in the ith iteration and |Hi| = 1−δδ |Bi|. Then we compute
∑
m∈B
|Qm| =
logn∑
i=1
∑
m∈Bi
|Qm| ≤
logn∑
i=1
|Bi| 2i ≤
logn∑
i=1
2δ
1− δ |Hi| 2
i ≤ 2δ
1− δ
∑
m∈G
|Qm| ≤ 2δ
1− δ |E| .
The first inequality holds by Lemma 4.6, while the second holds by the choice of the Hi and
the definition of the Gi.
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4.3 Approximation guarantee
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By Lemma 4.3, there are at most 4 |E| /k blocking pairs which are not
(2/k)-blocking. By Lemma 4.2, all (2/k)-blocking pairs are incident with B. Finally, by Lemma
4.4, the bad men contribute at most 4δ |E| blocking pairs for δ ≤ 1/2. Therefore, the total
number of blocking pairs is at most 4(δ + 1/k) |E|. Choosing δ = ε/8 and k = ⌈8/ε⌉ gives the
desired result.
4.4 Run-time Guarantee
Theorem 4.7. ASM(P, ε, n) runs in O(ε−3 log5(n)) communication rounds.
Proof. Notice that the only communication between processors occurs in ProposalRound.
ASM(P, ε, n) iterates QuantileMatch(P, k) a total of O(ε−2 log n) times, while quantile match
invokes ProposalRound(Q, k,A) O(ε−1) times. Finally, each step of ProposalRound can be
performed in O(1) communication rounds, except for Step 3, which calls MaximalMatching.
By [6], MaximalMatching runs in O(log4 n) communication rounds. Thus, ASM(P, ε, n)
requires O(ε−3 log5(n)) communication rounds, as claimed.
Remark 4.8. While the CONGEST model allows for unbounded local computation in each
round, the local computations required by ASM are quite simple. In fact, each communication
round can easily be implemented in nearly-linear time in n. Thus the synchronous run-time of
ASM is O˜(n). To our knowledge, this gives the first distributed algorithm whose synchronous
run-time is sub-quadratic in n, even for unbounded preferences.
5 Randomized Algorithms
The main source of complexity in ASM comes from finding a maximal matching. While
Hann´c´kowiak, Karon´ski, and Panconesi’s algorithm [6] is the most efficient known deterministic
algorithm, faster randomized algorithms are known. Specifically, we consider the algorithm
of Israeli and Itai [8]. They describe a simple randomized distributed algorithm which finds
a maximal matching in expected O(log n) rounds. By simply replacing MaximalMatching
with a truncated version Israeli and Itai’s algorithm, we obtain a faster randomized algorithm
for finding almost stable matchings. We refer the reader to Appendix A for details on the
guarantees for Israeli and Itai’s algorithm.
5.1 General preferences
Theorem 5.1. There exists a randomized distributed algorithm, RandASM(P, ε, n, δ), which
for any δ, ε > 0 finds a (1−ε)-stable matching with probability at least 1−δ in O(ε−3 log2(n/δε3))
rounds.
Proof sketch. We take RandASM to be exactly the same as ASM, except that we use Israeli
and Itai’s algorithm [8] for the MaximalMatching subroutine. Specifically, for Maximal-
Matching, we iterate MatchingRound (see Appendix A) O(log(n/δε3)) times. By Corollary
A.2, each call to MaximalMatching will succeed in finding a maximal matching with prob-
ability at least 1 − O(δε3/ log n). Since RandASM calls MaximalMatching O(ε−3/ log n)
times, by the union bound, every call toMaximalMatching succeeds with probability at least
1− δ. The remaining analysis of RandASM is identical to that of ASM.
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5.2 Almost-regular preferences
For α ≥ 1, We call preferences P α-almost-regular if maxm∈Y degm ≤ αminm∈Y degm. For
example, complete preferences (where all men rank all women) are 1-almost-regular, while uni-
formly bounded preferences are α-almost-regular for α = maxm∈Y degm. From an algorithmic
standpoint, α-almost-regular preferences are advantageous because in order to bound the pro-
portion of blocking edges from bad men, it suffices only to bound the number of bad men. By
Lemma 4.5, to obtain such a guarantee, one need only iterate QuantileMatch O(1) rounds
(instead of O(log n) times as required by ASM).
Further, for α-almost-regular preferences, we can relax our requirement that Maximal-
Matching actually find a maximal matching. We say that a player v is unmatched in G0 if v
does not satisfy property 1 or 2 in Definition 2.6. We call a subroutine AMM(η, δ) which finds
a matching in which only an η-fraction of players are left unmatched with probability at least
1 − δ (see Appendix A for details). These unmatched players are immediately removed from
play. With these simplifications, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 5.2. There exists a randomized distributed algorithmAlmostRegularASM(P, ε, δ, α)
which for α-almost-regular preferences P finds a (1−ε)-stable matching with probability at least
1− δ. The run-time of AlmostRegularASM(P, ε, δ, α) is O(αε3 log(α/δε)) rounds.
Proof sketch. AlmostRegularASM(P, ε, δ, α) works by iterating QuantileMatch O(αε−2)
times, which by Lemma 4.5 implies that only ε/4α fraction of men are bad.
We modify ProposalRound to call AMM(η, δ′) instead of MaximalMatching. AMM
runs in O(log((ηδ′)−1)) and finds a (1 − η)-maximal matching with probability (1 − δ′). Since
AMM is called O(αε−3) times, choosing η = O(ε4/α) and δ′ = O(δε3/α), AMM will leave at
most an ε/4α fraction of men unmatched in any call AMM with probability at least 1− δ, by
the union bound. Such unmatched men are immediately removed from play.
By the preceding two paragraphs, AlmostRegularASM produces a matching in which at
most an ε/2α fraction of men are either bad or unmatched. By α-almost-regularity, these men
can contribute at most ε
2
|E| blocking pairs. The remaining men are good, and therefore by
Lemmas 4.2 and 4.32 contribute at most ε
2
|E| blocking pairs.
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A Randomized maximal and almost maximal matchings
Israeli and Itai’s [8] algorithm for finding a maximal matching works by identifying a sparse
subgraph of G, then finding a large matching M1 in the sparse subgraph. The edges and
incident vertices ofM1, as well as remaining isolated vertices, are removed from G resulting in a
subgraph G1. The process is iterated, giving a sequence of subgraphs G1, G2, . . . and matchings
M1,M2, . . ., until Gk = ∅. At this point, M =
⋃
k
i=1Mi is a maximal matching. We give
pseudocode for Israeli and Itai’s main subroutine, which we callMatchingRound, in Algorithm
4. In [8], Israeli and Itai prove the following performance guarantee for MatchingRound.
Algorithm 4 MatchingRound(G): Finds a large matching in a graph
1: Each v ∈ V picks a neighbor w uniformly at random, forms oriented edge (v,w).
2: Each v ∈ V with degin(v) > 0 picks one in-coming edge (w, v) uniformly at random, deletes
remaining in-edges. Let G′ be the (undirected) graph formed by the chosen edges with
orientation ignored.
3: Each v ∈ V with degG′(v) > 0 chooses one incident edge (v,w) uniformly at random.
4: The matching M1 consists of edges (v,w) ∈ G′ which were chosen by both v and w in the
previous round. G1 = (V1, E1) is the induced subgraph of G formed by removing all vertices
contained in M1 and any remaining isolated vertices from G.
5: Output (G1,M1).
Lemma A.1. (Israeli and Itai [8]) There exists an absolute constant c < 1 such that on input
G = G0 = (V0, E0), the resulting graph G1 = (V1, E1) found by MatchingRound satisfies
E(|V1|) ≤ c |V0|.
As a consequence of Lemma A.1, we obtain the following useful result.
Corollary A.2. Let η > 0 be a parameter. Then s = O(log(n/η)) iterations of Matchin-
gRound suffice to produce a maximal matching in G with probability at least 1− η.
Proof. By Lemma A.1, we have E(|Vs|) ≤ csn. Therefore, applying Markov’s inequality gives
Pr(|Vs| ≥ 1) ≤ E(|Vs|)
1
≤ csn.
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The result follows by taking s ≥ log(n/η)/ log(c−1).
The almost regular variant of ASM only requires a subroutine that we finds matchings
which are almost maximal.
Definition A.3. Let G = (V,E) be a communication graph and M ⊂ E a matching in G. For
0 < η ≤ 1, we say that M is (1− η)-maximal if the set V ′ of vertices not satisfying conditions
1 or 2 in Definition 2.6 satisfies |V ′| ≤ η |V |.
We can apply Lemma A.1 to give a constant round algorithm which finds almost maximal
matchings.
Corollary A.4. There exists a randomized distributed algorithm AMM(G, η, δ) which finds a
(1−η)-maximal matching with probability at least (1−δ). AMM(G, η, δ) runs inO(log(η−1δ−1))
rounds.
Proof. Consider the algorithm which iterates MatchingRound s times. We apply Lemma A.1
and Markov’s inequality to obtain
Pr(|Vs| ≥ ηn) ≤ c
sn
ηn
= η−1cs.
Choosing s = O(log(δ−1η−1)), we have η−1cs ≤ δ, which gives the desired result.
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